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COMMENTS
ARBITRATION-INCORPORATION OF ARBITRATION CLAUSE By GENERAL REF-
ERENCE IN CONTRACT TO TRADE ASSOCIATION RuLE.-It is the right of
the parties in New York to agree that any dispute between them shall be
submitted to arbitration,' and that they shall have no recourse to the
courts until after such an arbitration.2 Since, however, contracts to
arbi.trate presuppose an agreement to forego the right to resort to
the courts for redress, a contract to arbitrate, which is disputed, will be
subjected to strict judicial construction, in order that the parties may not
be deprived of their constitutional right to seek redress in the courts.8
"No one is under a duty to resort to arbitration unless by clear lan-
guage he has so agreed. ' 4 If a party wishes to bind another to an agree-
ment to arbitrate future disputes, such purpose should be accomplished
in a way that each party to the arrangement will fully and clearly com-
prehend that the agreement to arbitrate exists and binds the parties thereto.
Clearly expressing the intent to arbitrate disputes under a contract
has been a problem in those cases involving the incorporation by reference
into the primary contract of collateral instruments which contain rules
or provision for arbitration of such disputes.0 Generally, where a writ-
ing refers to another document or set of rules, that other instrument or
so much of it as is referred to, is to be interpreted as part of the writing.7
The signer of a deed or other instrument expressive of a jural act, is conclu-
sively bound thereby; that his mind never gave assent to the terms expressed
is not material,8 and he is conclusively presumed to know its contents.0 Never-
theless, in Bachmann-Emmerich & Co., Inc. v. S. A. Wenger & Co.,
Inc.,10 a case involving a dispute over a contract for the sale of raw silk,
the Appellate Division affirmed an order denying compulsory arbitration,
holding that the clause, "All sales are governed by the raw silk rules
adopted by the Silk Association of America", did not show the intent of
the parties to be bound by an arbitration provision contained in those
rules.
On the basis of the Bachmann case it would appear that the parties to
N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 1448.
2 Wallace v. German-American Insurance Co., 41 Fed. 742 (C. C. N. D. Iowa
1882).
3 General Silk Importing Co., Inc. v. Gerseta Corp., 200 App. Div. 786, 194 N. Y.
Supp. 2d 15 (1st Dep't 1922); aff'd 234 N. Y. 513, 138 N. E. 427 (1922).
4 Lehman v. Ostrovsky, 264 N. Y. 130, 132, 190 N. E. 208, 209 (1934).
5 Arthur Philip Export Corp. v. Leathertone, 275 App. Div. 102, 87 N. Y. Supp.
2d 665 (1st Dep't 1949). See' Matter of Rosenshine, 199 Misc. 984, 102 N. Y. S.
2d 3 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1950).
6 See note 3 supra.
7 3 WIsLsoSN, Co T AcTs (Rev. Ed. § 628); Newburger v. American Surety
Co., 242 N. Y. 134, 125 N. E. 155 (1926).
8 Pimpinello v. Swift, 253 N. Y. 159, 170 N. E. 530 (1930).
9 Metzger v. Aetna Insurance Co., 227 N. Y. 441, 125 N. E. 815 (1920).
10 204 App. Div. 282, 197 N. Y. Supp. 879 (1st Dep't 1922).
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a contract would not be bound to arbitrate disputes arising therefrom when
the contract did not provide for arbitration, but incorporated by reference
a collateral instrument which contained provision for arbitration. Arbitra-
tion was obtained, however, in Level Export Corp. v. Wolz, Aiken & Co.,1
which involved a dispute between the plaintiff-buyer and defendant-seller
over a contract for the sale of fabric. The contract contained a clause
that, ".... this salesnote is subject to the provisions of the Standard Cotton
Textile Salesnote which by this reference, is incorporated as a part of this
agreement and together herewith constitutes the entire contract between
buyer and seller." One of the rules in the Standard Cotton Textile Sales-
note was a provision for arbitration. In denying plaintiff's motion for a
stay of arbitration, the court distinguished the case before it from the
Bachmann case, holding that the clause which incorporated the Standard
Cotton Textile Salesnote could not more clearly express an agreement
to the arbitration provision contained in the incorporated Salesnote. It
would now appear that if a contract uses such nice language as, "by
this reference we do hereby incorporate as part of this agreement" then
the parties are put on notice as to the incorporated collateral instrument,
and are bound by the provisions therein; whereas, if the parties merely
state, "all sales are governed by", or "all sales are made subject to" a
collateral instrument, the parties are not put on notice as to the collateral
instrument and are not bound by a provision for arbitration contained
therein. A strong dissent in the Level case 1 2 urges that the legal effect of
the language in the contract involved in that case is identical with the
legal effect of the language used in the Bachmann and General Silk cases.' 3
The seemingly untenable distinction between the contract involved in
the Level case, and the contract involved in the Bachmann case, has been
acknowledged in a recent case, 14 where the court suggested that if the in-
corporation clause of the Level contract 5 had been set forth in the contract
of the case before it, then arbitration would undoubtedly have been the
exclusive remedy. 16 The contract in question therein contained a clause
that, "This contract is also subject to the Cotton Yarn Rules of 1938
as amended." One of these rules was a provision for arbitration. An order
denying a stay of arbitration was reversed, because the language making
the contract subject to the Cotton Yarn Rules failed to show with sufficient
definiteness, that the minds of the parties agreed on the arbitration pro-
vision contained therein.
It would thus appear that the New York courts have made a strict
but tenuous distinction between "words of incorporation" as set forth in
11 305 N. Y. 82, 111 N. E. 2d 218 (1953).
12 Id. at 88, 111 N. E. 2d 218, 221.
13 Bachmann-Emmerich & Co., Inc. v. S. A. Wenger & Co., Inc., supra note 10;
General Silk Importing Co., Inc. v. Gerseta Corp., note 5 supra.
14 Riverdale Fabrics Corp. v. Tillinghast-Stiles Co., 306 N. Y. 288, 118 N. E. 2d
104 (1954).
IS See note 11 supra.
16 See note 14 supra.
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the contract in the Level case,' 7 and "words of inclusion" as set forth in
the contract involved in the Bachmann case.' 8 The courts seem to feel that
the latter merely states the connection of some instrument collateral to the
primary contract, but does not show an agreement to the arbitration clause
therein contained.' 9 It is with no surprise that the order granting a stay
of proceedings pending arbitration was reversed in the recent case of Weiner
v. Mercury Artists Corp.20
There, defendant contracted to supply plaintiff with an orchestra which
contract contained a clause providing that ". . . the rules of the American
Federation of Musicians are made part of this contract". One of the AFM
rules provides for arbitration of all disputes. Plaintiff began an action at law
for breach of the contract, whereupon defendant moved to stay the legal pro-
ceedings pending arbitration, to which it claimed it was entitled. The trial
court granted the motion, but on appeal, the Appellate Division reversed,
vacating the order.
Since the Court of Appeals had already held in the Level case that
the words, "we incorporate by reference", are sufficient words to show the
intent of the parties to be bound by an arbitration provision contained in
these rules, whereas the words "we agree to be governed by" or, "this con-
tract is subject to", are not words sufficient to show the clear intent of
the parties to be bound by arbitration provisions in a collateral instrument,
the Appellate Division was consistent in holding that the words of incor-
poration in the Weiner case did not show the intent of the parties to be
bound by an arbitration provision contained in the rules.
There appear to be many problems, therefore, which confront the legal
draftsman in this area. However, the attorney who .seeks to provide for
arbitration, by incorporating by reference into the contract some collateral
instrument which contains an arbitration provision, may be guided by the
majority opinion of the Court of Appeals as set forth by Judge Van Voorhis
in Riverdale Fabrics v. Tillinghast-Stiles Co.:
"If part of the care exhibited in drafting the [trade] rules had been used in men-
tioning arbitration in the contract, there would be no difficulty.... Instead, the
form of words favored appears to have been designed to avoid any resistance that
might arise if arbitration were brought to the attention of the contracting parties
as the exclusive remedy in case of disputes." 2' 1
17 See note 11 supra.
18 Bachmann-Emmerich & Co., Inc. v. S. A. Wenger & Co., Inc., supra note 12;
General Silk Importing Co., Inc. v. Gerseta Corp., supa note 5. In both of the above
cases, the contract stated, "All sales are governed by the raw silk rules .... 
'9 See Matter of Hub Industries, 183 Misc. 767, 769, 54 N. Y. Supp. 2d 106, 108
(Sup. Court 1944): "No particular form of words is necessary to the making of a
valid agreement for arbitration. It is true that if the word arbitration had been used,
probably no controversy would have arisen, the use of that word, however, is unneces-
sary if the court is able to determine from the agreement that it was the intention of
the parties that the controversy would be settled by arbitration."
20 284 App. Div. 108, 130 N. Y. S. 2d 570 (1st Dep't 1954).




FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN LABOR LAW: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.-The
Supreme Court of the United States, in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,'
has further dealt with the conflict between the states and the federal gov-
ernment over jurisdiction in regulating labor union activity. The court held
that where a union's conduct had been the subject of an unfair labor prac-
tice complaint before the National Labor Relations Board, a state court
was subsequently without power to regulate the conduct, despite the fact
that the Board had previously dismissed the complaint for failure to state
a federal unfair labor practice, and notwithstanding that the conduct vio-
lated a state statute.
The controversy grew out of a work-assignment dispute between the
International Association of Machinists and the United Brotherhood of Car-
penters, both craft unions representing different groups of employees in the
same large St. Louis brewery.2 Each of the unions claimed that certain
millwright work should be awarded to its members, and when the machin-
ists' claim was refused, it called a strike to enforce its demands. At the
time, the only millwright work at the plant was being done by a contractor
using machinists' labor.
The day after the strike began, Anheuser-Busch filed a charge of an un-
fair labor practice against the machinists, under § 8(b)(4)(D) of the
Taft-Hartley Act.3 That subsection provides in pertinent part that it shall
be an "unfair labor practice for a labor organization . . . to engage in, or
to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in a
strike ... where the object thereof is ... forcing or requiring any employer
to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization
... rather than to employees in another labor organization ....
The NLRB quashed the notice of hearing in this case, reasoning that
the machinists could not have been demanding the assignment of "particu-
lar work" within the meaning of this subsection, inasmuch as no millwright
work was being performed by other than machinists' labor at the time,
and that the union was not demanding that the contractors give their work
to its members.4
After the employer had filed its charge, but before the NLRB had
dismissed it, the employer brought suit in the state court for an injunction.
Alleging that the union's picketing prevented the movement of railroad
cars into and out of the brewery premises, the employer maintained that
1 348 U. S. 468, 75 S. Ct. 480, 99 L. Ed. 386 (1955).
2 The work-assignment dispute between these two unions is of many years' stand-
ing, and gave rise to criminal prosecution which culminated in United States v. Hutch-
eson, 312 U. S. 219, 61 S. Ct. 463, 85 L. Ed. 788 (1941), a landmark decision which
in effect made the Sherman Act inapplicable to concerted union activity carried on for
union objectives. See Teller, Federal Intervention in Labor Disputes and Collective
Bargaining-The Hutcheson Case, 40 McH. L. REv. 24 (1941).
3 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(4)
(D) (1952).
4 District No. 9, International Association of Machinists, 101 N. L. R. B. 346
(1952).
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the picketing constituted an unlawful secondary boycott under the common
law of Missouri, and also an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade under
a state statute.
5
The trial court granted a permanent injunction on the authority of
the state statute. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, 6 after the Board's
dismissal of the unfair labor practice charge, referring to the Board's rul-
ing as a determination that "no labor dispute existed between these parties
and that no unfair labor practices were there involved."'7 The state Supreme
Court reasoned that inasmuch as no federal unfair labor practices were in-
volved, the state court retained power to enforce its restraint-of-trade stat-
ute, and its jurisdiction was not pre-empted by federal legislation.
On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, the judg-
ment of the Missouri Court was reversed, upon the ground that the state
court was without jurisdiction to entertain the injunction suit. The high
court proceeded on the theory that the nature of the controversy brought
it within that area over which Congress had given the NLRB exclusive
jurisdiction.
The Weber case is the latest in a chain of decisions in which the
Supreme Court has sought to. establish a dividing line between state and
federal jurisdictions, which Congress has suggested in general terms only.
On one side of the line are those situations involving violence or other
clear illegality which are concededly within the police power of the state to
regulate.8 On the other side of the line are those acts and practices ex-
pressly protected or forbidden by federal legislation, which the state courts,
under the doctrine of pre-emption, are powerless to adjudicate.0 In two
recent cases, however, the Court has taken seemingly opposite positions
in reviewing state court actions in situations where, as here, there were al-
legedly present violations of the Taft-Hartley Act.
In 1954, the Court decided in Garner v. Teamsters Union,'° that
Pennsylvania could not enjoin under its own labor statute conduct which
had been made an unfair labor practice under the federal statute. It is to
be noted that although this was the ultimate issue as presented to the
Supreme Court by the briefs and arguments, it was not the issue in the
trial court, and did not reflect the actual facts in the case.
The alleged wrongful conduct consisted of organizational picketing of
Garner's premises by a union representing some, but less than a majority,
5 R. S. Mo., § 416.010, V. A. M. S. The complaint also charged that the union
conduct violated certain sections of the Taft-Hartley Act, but the decision in the case
did not turn upon that fact.
6 364 Mo. 573, 265 S. W. 2d 325 (1954).
7 Id. at 584, 265 S. W. 2d at 332.
8 Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 740,
62 S. Ct. 820, 86 L. Ed. 1154 (1942); International Union v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, 336 U. S. 245, 69 S. Ct. 516, 93 L. Ed. 651 (1949).
9 Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538, 65 S. Ct. 1373, 89 L. Ed. 1782 (1945); Inter-
national Union v. O'Brien, 339 U. S. 454, 70 S. Ct. 781, 94 L. Ed. 978 (1950).
10 346 U. S. 485, 74 S. Ct. 161, 98 L. Ed. 228 (1954).
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of his employees. The union contended in the trial court that the picket-
ing, if wrongful at all, constituted an unfair labor practice under § 8(b) (1)
(A) of the Taft-Hartley Act, and therefore the state court was without
jurisdiction to issue an injunction sought by the employer. The trial court
held, on the authority of two cases in point decided by the NLRB,11 that
the conduct did not constitute an unfair labor practice within the meaning
of the Act. The trial court then found that the picketing was an unjusti-
fied act, and quoting the oft-repeated language of Dorchy v. Kansas,'
12
granted the injunction.1 No reliance on the Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Act'4 appears in the trial court decision.
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, 15 holding that
the power of the NLRB to adjudicate unfair labor practices was paramount,
hence the state courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the controversy. This ra-
tionale overlooked the basis of decision in the trial court, that the NLRB,
the tribunal charged with interpreting and enforcing the federal Act, had
already twice held identical conduct not to constitute an unfair labor prac-
tice.' 0 This rationale nevertheless formed the basis of decision in the United
States Supreme Court, which affirmed the state Supreme Court's ruling.
7
Several months later, the Supreme Court decided United Construction
Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp.'8 In that case, the employer
brought a tort action for money damages in a state court against a union.
The wrongful conduct alleged was the coercive and intimidating demands
upon the plaintiff's employees that they join the union, in violation of their
rights under § 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act. When the employees refused to
join, the union retaliated with threats and intimidations so violent that
the employer was forced to abandon work in the area. Upon a showing
of substantial loss, the plaintiff employer was awarded a money judgment,
which was affirmed on appeal. 19
When the Laburnum case came to the Supreme Court, the Court assumed
in its decision that this conduct, like the conduct involved in the Garner case,
violated § 8 (b) (1) (A). Nevertheless, it sustained the state court action
on the ground that regardless of the status of the conduct as a federal un-
fair labor practice, the State was not prohibited from protecting the private
interests of the parties by use of the common law tort action, a remedy
'1 Watson's Specialty Store, 80 N. L. R. B. 91 (1948); aff'd sub nons. Carpen-
ters Union v. N. L. R. B., 341 U. S. 707, 71 S. Ct. 966, 95 L. Ed. 1309 (1951);
Ryan Construction Corp., 85 N. L. R. B. 76 (1952).
12 272 U. S. 306, 311, 47 S. Ct. 86, 89, 71 L. Ed. 248, 269 (1926). "The right
to carry on business be it called liberty or property has value and to interfere with
this right without just cause is unlawful."
3 62 Dauph. Co. (Pa.) Rep. 339 (1952).
14 Pa. Laws 1937, 1172; Purdons Pa. Stat. Ann., 1952, Tit. 43, § 211.6.
1; 373 Pa. 19, 94 A. 2d 893 (1952).
16 See note 11, supra.
17 See note 10, supra.
28 347 U. S. 656, 74 S. Ct. 833, 98 L. Ed. 1025 (1954).
19 194 Va. 872, 75 S. E. 2d 694 (1953).
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for which the Taft-Hartley Act made no provision. This decision seemed
to represent a modification of the rule of the Garner case, in that in the
Laburnum case the Court allowed the redress of a private wrong in the
state court, although the wrong coincidentally constituted an unfair labor
practice. In affirming the state court's judgment, the Supreme Court ap-
peared to be reaffirming its position taken in earlier cases, that Congress
designedly left open an area for state control,2o and that consequently the
state's own determination of its public policy should be allowed to govern
the adjudication of private rights,21 especially when the wrongs involved
were governable by the state or entirely ungoverned.
2 2
The decision in the Weber case seems to re-commit the Court to the
principles of the Garner case and its predecessors, 23 by holding that even
where the NLRB has inferentially decided that no unfair labor practices
have been committed,2 4 the investiture of that tribunal by Congress with
exclusive jurisdiction to determine such controversies bars state interven-
tion unless violence or other wrongful conduct clearly warrants the exer-
cise of its police powers.2 5
20 See note 8, supra.
21 Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U. S. 470, 70 S. Ct. 773, 94 L. Ed. 995 (1950).
22 International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, see note 8,
supra.
23 Hill v. Florida, supra note 9; Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, 340 U. S. 383, 71 S. Ct. 359, 95 L. Ed. 364 (1951).
24 See note 3, supra.
25 See note 8, supra.
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